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A BRIEF APPRAISAL OF THE
CURT FLOOD ACT OF 1998 FROM
THE MINOR LEAGUE PERSPECTIVE
GARY R. ROBERTS
In late 1998, as the Congressional session was nearing adjournment,
the House of Representatives unanimously passed the Curt Flood Act of
1998 ("the Act").' Since the Act had earlier been passed unanimously
by voice vote in the Senate, it immediately went to the White House
where President Clinton signed it into law. The unanimous passage in
both houses of Congress masked years of sometimes bitter wrangling
among various groups and individuals over the language of such legisla-
tion, but the unanimity with which it passed also probably quite accu-
rately suggests that the Act is likely to have no great significance in
shaping the structure or conduct of professional baseball in the years
ahead.
I. PRELUDE TO THE Acr's PASSAGE
Ever since 1953 when in Toolson v. New York Yankees2 the Supreme
Court reaffirmed Justice Holmes' 1922 Federal BasebalP decision that
first recognized that baseball was neither commerce nor interstate, it has
seemed like a biannual ritual for at least one congressman or senator to
propose a bill that would either wholly or partially bring the business of
professional baseball within the scope of the Sherman and Clayton Anti-
trust Acts. Such efforts seemed to increase in both number and rhetori-
cal levels after Justice Blackmun's famous 1972 opinion for a 7-2
majority in Flood v. Kuhn4 that once again held that the business of
baseball was not covered by the antitrust laws. However, even though
some congressmen and senators were able occasionally to convene com-
mittee hearings on the merits of repealing what has come to be known as
the "baseball exemption"5 (which I have always believed was more
1. Pub.L. 105-297 (105th Cong. 1998), filed as S. 53 before substantial amendments, ad-
ding section 27 to the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 12 et seq.
2. 346 U.S. 356 (1953).
3. Federal Base Ball Club of Baltimore, Inc. v. National League of Professional Baseball
Clubs, Inc., 259 U.S. 200 (1922).
4. 407 U.S. 258 (1972).
5. The most notable pre-1994 congressional hearings on the baseball exemption were con-
vened in 1992 by Ohio Senator Howard Metzenbaum, Chairman of the Judiciary Committee's
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properly called an antitrust "exclusion" 6), proposed legislation to do so
never made it out of committee or was thought by most to have any
serious chance of passage-that is until a bitter strike by players resulted
in canceling the 1994 World Series.
In 1994, public and congressional feelings toward the national past-
time reached an all time low. Not only did the bitter strike wipe out one
of the most exciting seasons ever and scuttle the World Series for the
first time in modem history, but several other troubling aspects of the
baseball business were receiving a lot of public attention and scorn. Two
events in 1992 that had triggered the Metzenbaum Hearings7 also in-
creased the public and political interest in pursuing a legislative response
to the baseball antitrust exclusion. Commissioner Fay Vincent had been
forced to resign his office in August of 1992, and the owners had indefi-
nitely turned the management of Major League Baseball (MLB) over to
one of their own, Milwaukee Brewers owner Allan "Bud" Selig, as the
chairman of the MLB Executive Council, rather than hire a new com-
missioner who might use his historical power to act "in the best interests
of baseball" in a way that could compromise the owners' upcoming labor
negotiations.8 Also, in 1992 the National League owners had refused to
approve the sale of the San Francisco Giants to an investor group that
was going to move the team's home games to St. Petersburg, Florida,9 an
event which not only outraged congressmen and senators from Florida
(although did not seem to bother many politicians in Northern Califor-
nia), but also brought attention to the growing practice of teams in all
subcommittee that oversaw antitrust matters, as a result of the furor that arose when the
National League owners vetoed a proposed sale of the San Francisco Giants that would have
resulted in the team's home games being relocated to St. Petersburg, Florida. See Baseball
Antitrust Immunity: Hearing Before the Subcomm. On Antitrust, Monopolies and Business
Rights, Senate Comm. On the Judiciary, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. 33 (Serial No. J-102-90)(Dec. 10,
1992) [hereinafter Metzenbaum Hearings]. This hearing was a traumatic event for the author
of this article when Senator Metzenbaum, in responding to my stated view that some form of
government regulation of baseball was advisable because Major League Baseball was a natu-
ral monopoly, suggested that I was too liberal for him. See id. at 435.
6. My view is that an exemption is an express provision or an inherent implication in a
statute that carves out something for special treatment from an otherwise law of general appli-
cation. Baseball's antitrust immunity, on the other hand, was the result of the courts inter-
preting the language of the Sherman Act as not covering the activity of staging professional
baseball games. Thus baseball is not "exempt" from the antitrust laws, but rather is simply not
covered (i.e., is "excluded") by the law as written in the first place.
7. See supra note 5.
8. See Murray Chass, A Decision: No New Commissioner, N.Y. TimEs, Jan. 20, 1994, Sec.
B, at 15.
9. This event is described in Piazza v. Major League Baseball, 831 F. Supp. 420, 422-23
(E.D. Pa. 1993).
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sports, particularly football, of using the ability to relocate teams to ex-
tract huge concessions from local communities. Furthermore, MLB had
just entered a new television arrangement that for the first time would
not have all post-season playoff games shown on free national television,
an event that triggered fears in many that significant bleeding of games
from free TV over to pay-per-view would soon occur. Thus, for several
reasons, by late 1994, antitrust law and sports, and particularly baseball's
antitrust exclusion, were in Congress' crosshairs.
Although legislation that would have lifted the baseball antitrust ex-
clusion only for labor market restraints did pass the House Judiciary
Committee in the Fall of 1994, the first time such legislation had ever
made it out of committee, it died without making it to the floor of the
House when the 103rd Congress adjourned in November. There was
substantial support for the view that it would be inappropriate for Con-
gress to pass this type of legislation in the middle of a strike and labor
dispute, but there were many who also believed that once the strike was
resolved, Congress would move quickly to pass similar legislation. My
own view at the time was that once the strike was settled and a new
bargaining agreement was entered into, the public's, and thus Congress'
interest in baseball's antitrust status would soon fall off the radar screen.
Also, the new Congress that convened in January of 1995 was for the
first time in decades controlled on both sides of the Capitol by Republi-
cans who would likely have less enthusiasm for attacking baseball's sta-
tus quo. New Speaker Newt Gingrich and new Judiciary Committee
Chair Henry Hyde did not seem likely to lead any charge for abolishing
the baseball antitrust exclusion.
The strike finally ended just in time for the start of the 1995 baseball
season (albeit three weeks late), but only after a district judge in New
York had ruled in a Section 10(j) preliminary injunction proceeding'0
that the NLRB had a reasonable probability of successfully arguing that
the owners had committed unfair labor practices (ULPs) by unilaterally
abolishing salary arbitration and by making unilateral changes to the
free agency system." After this ruling, the players voted to end their
strike, and in the wake of the ULP ruling the owners were apparently
sufficiently fearful of potential legal liability to abandon plans to lock the
players out and start the season with temporary replacement players.
However, no bargaining agreement was in sight, and Major League
10. 29 U.S.C. § 1600).
11. See Silverman v. Major League Baseball Player-Relations Committee, 880 F. Supp.
246 (S.D.N.Y. 1995), affd, 67 F.3d 1054 (2d Cir. 1995).
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Baseball was played in both 1995 and 1996 without a collective bargain-
ing agreement, under the terms of the expired agreement. In the
meantime, driven by a surprising degree of interest by new Senate Judi-
ciary Committee Chairman Orrin Hatch, that Committee approved in
1996 a bill very similar to the one passed out of the House Judiciary
Committee in 1994, but it too died in that presidential election year with-
out ever coming to a vote in the full Senate.
In December 1996, the two sides finally reached a new bargaining
agreement (CBA). The terms of the new agreement were made public
in early 1997, and to most outside observers' surprise, it contained an
Article 28 on the second to last page of the 108 page document, which
provided:
ARTICLE XXVIHI-Anitrust
The Clubs and the Association will jointly request and cooperate
in lobbying Congress to pass a law that will clarify that Major
League Baseball Players are covered under the antitrust laws (i.e.,
that Major League Players will have the same rights under the
antitrust laws as do other professional athletes, e.g., football and
basketball players), along with a provision that makes it clear that
the passage of that bill does not change the application of the
antitrust laws in any other context or with respect to any other
person or entity. 12
In short, the owners and players made the extraordinary commitment in
a CBA to cooperate in seeking congressional passage of a bill lifting the
antitrust immunity for baseball, but only to the extent that it would per-
mit suits by Major League players.
II. THE ENACrMENT OF THE CURT FLOOD Acr
When Congress became aware of the unusual provision in the CBA
under which both sides would cooperate in getting the historic immunity
lifted as it applied to major league players, Senate Judiciary Committee
Chairman Orrin Hatch and ranking Committee Democrat Patrick Leahy
saw a marvelous political opportunity-to take credit for passing a bill
similar to ones that had failed every year for decades without any signifi-
cant opposition or political risk. With the owners and players union both
supporting the legislation, and consumer groups unlikely to oppose it,
who could object to or slow down its inevitable passage? Thus, Senators
12. BASIC AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE AMERIcAN LEAGUE OF PROFESSIONAL BASEBALL
CLUBS AND THE NATIONAL LEAGUE OF PROFESSIONAL BASEBALL CLUBS AND MAJOR
LEAGUE BASEBALL PLAYERS ASSOCIATION, effective January 1, 1997, Art. XXVIII, at 107.
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Hatch and Leahy quickly introduced S.53, the Curt Flood Act of 1997,
which contained language that seemed to do exactly what Article
XXVIII of the baseball CBA had called for-a lifting of the antitrust
immunity for baseball, but only to the extent that baseball's rules af-
fected Major League players. It was very brief.
A BILL
To require the general application of the antitrust laws to major
league baseball, and for other purposes.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the
United States of America in Congress Assembled,
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
This Act may be cited as the 'Curt Flood Act of 1997'.
SECTION 2. APPLICATION OF THE ANTITRUST LAWS
TO PROFESSIONAL MAJOR LEAGUE BASEBALL.
The Clayton Act (15 U.S.C. 12 et seq.) is amended by adding
at the end the following new section:
SEC. 27. (a) Subject to subsection (b), the antitrust laws shall ap-
ply to the business of professional major league
baseball.
(b) Nothing in this section shall be construed to af-
fect-
(1) the applicability or nonapplicability of the anti-
trust laws to the amateur draft of professional base-
ball, the minor league reserve clause, the agreement
between professional major league baseball teams
and teams of the National Association of Baseball,
commonly known as the 'Professional Baseball
Agreement', or any other matter relating to the mi-
nor leagues;
(2) the applicability or nonapplicability of the anti-
trust laws to any restraint by professional baseball
on franchise relocation; or
(3) the application of Public Law 87-331 (15 U.S.C.
1291 et seq.)(commonly known as the Sports
Broadcasting Act of 1961).
The expectation of smooth sailing for this bill was almost immedi-
ately dashed. Senators Hatch and Leahy had overlooked the one con-
stituency that over the years had been the most effective opponent of
any attempts to repeal the baseball antitrust exclusion-the baseball mi-
nor leagues. And because the National Association of Professional
1999]
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Baseball Leagues (the umbrella organization of the 17 minor leagues af-
filiated with the major leagues) contains roughly 175 domestic teams lo-
cated in almost as many congressional districts, most with local owners
and deep roots in their respective communities, the NAPBL's political
influence in Congress, and especially in the House of Representatives, is
substantial. Indeed, the political judgment of many involved in the pro-
cess was that given the strong support for minor league baseball of
House Judiciary Committee Chairman Henry Hyde and many other
members of that Committee, there was virtually no chance of any bill
affecting baseball's antitrust exclusion ever getting to the House floor
without the support of the NAPBL.13
Because the NAPBL was not a party to the CBA in which the union
and Major League owners had committed to cooperate in passing such
legislation, it had no obvious reason or incentive to support any bill that
would weaken the antitrust exclusion for baseball. Even if the bill would
not directly affect the legal status of the minor leagues, to the extent it
affected the legal status of the major leagues and thereby caused major
league teams to have to spend more money on compensating major
league players or defending lawsuits, the minor leagues would be ad-
versely affected because the major leagues would probably not be able
to provide as much subsidy to their minor league affiliates. (Indeed,
there was some suspicion that one of the MLBPA's ultimate objectives
was financially to starve and eventually to shrink the minor leagues so
that the major leagues would spend less money on player development
and more on compensating the union's members who were already on
major league rosters.) Thus, unless the legislation provided some benefit
for the minor leagues, there was no reason why the NAPBL would want
to give the crucial support the Act needed to be passed.
When looking at the original draft of the bill proposed by Senators
Hatch and Leahy, it might appear that subsection (b)(1) would give the
minor leagues all that they could hope for. But the NAPBL did not feel
13. In the interests of full disclosure, I should reveal that I was engaged to advise the
NAPBL on antitrust issues and how the minor leagues' antitrust status might be affected by
any proposed bill. This was a very interesting endeavor as dozens of different drafts and
modifications were put forth and dissected by people representing the Judiciary Committee
staff, various individual senators and congressmen, the Major Leagues, the Major League
Baseball Players Association, the NAPBL, the Justice Department, and others. With some-
times lengthy interludes while the Senate Judiciary Committee focussed its attention on other
matters of national significance, the process involved innumerable phone calls and meetings
involving two or more of the interested groups. Often patience ran thin, but each time, after
the tempers cooled, everyone came back to the perceived political reality that no bill stood a
chance without the support of the NAPBL.
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that way. They were concerned that a judge with an inclination to con-
strue the Federal Baseball holding narrowly vis-h-vis the minor leagues
could easily reason that the Act was an invitation to the courts to recon-
sider Federal Baseball and Flood, and/or that because antitrust exemp-
tions are to be construed narrowly, only those maters covered by the
literal language of the Act in exactly the form as they existed on the date
the Act was enacted would continue to be protected under Federal Base-
ball/Flood (if they were at all anyway). Thus, the NAPBL saw the Act as
a potential source of great mischief for it, and certainly nothing of bene-
fit sufficient to warrant throwing its support behind the bill.
As detailed below, what finally emerged from the long, rancorous,
and difficult process is the Curt Flood Act of 1998, which contains sev-
eral provisions that certainly provide substantial legal aid and comfort to
the NAPBL in its effort to protect itself from the coverage of the anti-
trust laws.
A. The Scope of Activity Covered
The operative provision in the Act is in Section 3(a) [which will be-
come 15 U.S.C. § 27(a)], which provides that:
... the conduct, acts, practices, or agreements of persons in the
business of organized professional major league baseball directly
relating to or affecting employment of major league baseball play-
ers to play baseball at the major league level are subject to the
antitrust laws to the same extent such conduct, acts, practices, or
agreements would be subject to the antitrust laws if engaged in by
persons in other professional sports business affecting interstate
commerce.
This language is certainly much more precise and convoluted than the
language in the original bill which merely said that "the antitrust laws
shall apply to the business of professional major league baseball," sub-
ject to enumerated exceptions. This was done so that the protection for
the minor leagues (as well as the major leagues with respect to nonplayer
matters) would not be left simply to the exceptions, but would also occur
in the operative language itself. Thus, a good argument can be made
that even in the operative language, the minor leagues (and major
leagues in nonplayer matters) are clearly protected.
This protection occurs in two ways. First, because antitrust liability
for baseball will not be triggered unless it involves the behavior of "per-
sons in the business of organized professional major league baseball,"
rules adopted or conduct engaged in solely by those engaged in the busi-
ness of minor league baseball would be outside the coverage. But this,
1999]
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while obviously limiting, was by itself still insufficient. The language
does not cover only behavior that is exclusively engaged in by persons in
the business of major league baseball, and thus if any involved person is
in the business of major league baseball, that rule or conduct would sat-
isfy this element and extend liability to all persons involved. And be-
cause of the close relationship the NAPBL and all of its teams has with
the major leagues, a plaintiff could argue that virtually everything the
minor leagues does involves the major leagues and thus persons engaged
in the business of major league baseball.
Second, the challenged rule or conduct had to "directly relat[e] to or
affect[ ] employment of major league baseball players to play baseball at
the major league level." Again, this was comforting for the minor
leagues. Everyone involved in the negotiations believed that the only
reasonable interpretation of this language, especially given the require-
ment that the rule or conduct had to relate "directly" to major league
employment, would exclude from the Act's coverage not only everything
associated with minor league baseball, but also everything associated
with major league baseball except direct player restraints. Thus, owner-
ship rules and decisions, franchise relocation decisions (like that involv-
ing the Giants only a few years earlier), television rules and practices,
and trademark and logo licensing (and particularly Major League Base-
ball Properties that had recently been the target of a suit against MLB
by the Yankees and adidas) would all be outside the scope of the Act.
But again, the NAPBL was concerned that while the vast majority of
judges would read this language in the limiting way it was intended,
there was still wiggle room for those few judges with an agenda to apply
the antitrust laws to the minor leagues or these other major league
activities.
Finally, it is worth noting that the minor leagues were also concerned
that the major leagues not be subjected to antitrust litigation and risk
beyond the narrow scope of purely major league labor market matters.
Because of the minor leagues' close and ongoing relationship with the
major leagues, and with each NAPBL team having a direct contractual
relationship with a major league team, any substantial burden placed on
the major leagues because of unintended overreaching by plaintiffs and
courts on a wide range of nonplayer matters would likely have a negative
"trickle-down" effect on the financial health of the minor leagues. Thus,
most of the protections written into the language of the Act at the behest
of the minor leagues, including the limitations written into the operative
language of section 3(a) itself, also were designed to, and did, have the
[Vol. 9:413
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effect of protecting the major leagues from antitrust exposure for all
nonplayer matters previously protected by Federal Baseball/Flood.
B. The Major Qualification
While the NAPBL was confident that section 3(a) of the Act as it
finally emerged would not be interpreted as lifting the Federal Baseball
exclusion on any minor league rules or activity (or major league rules or
conduct involving franchise location, ownership, broadcasting, or intel-
lectual property rights or licensing), there remained a pervasive fear that
some judges hostile to the exclusion would still use the new Act as an
invitation to reconsider Federal Baseball. Since Justice Blackmun had
argued in Flood that the courts should not overturn or reconsider the
Federal Baseball exclusion in part because Congress has not acted to
change it, 4 continued congressional inaction had given comfort to those
in the business of baseball. But the fear in 1998 was that if Congress
expressly lifted the exclusion as it applied to major league player re-
straints and then said nothing about everything else, it might be inter-
preted by some judges as Congress having wiped the slate clean on
everything else which thus opened the door for judicial reconsideration
from scratch of the entire exclusion/exemption issue. This seemed like a
very strained and unlikely interpretation, but even if there was a remote
chance of it happening the NAPBL wanted to foreclose it.
The minor leagues also had a greater and more specific concern. The
line between major and minor league employment terms is sometimes
hazy. Perhaps the best example is compensation paid by one major
league team to another for the loss of a free agent. A longtime feature
of the collective bargaining agreement between MLB and the major
league players is that a club losing a free agent player must receive an
amateur draft choice from the club that signs the player. Since the ama-
teur draft is a means of selecting players for "entry level" employment in
the minor leagues, it seems clear that it is a "term or condition" of minor
league employment. However, a 1992 decision by grievance arbitrator
George Nicholau had held that the Major Leagues could not unilaterally
change the amateur draft by increasing the length of time that the draft-
ing club has the exclusive right to sign the drafted "entry level" player.
Instead, the arbitrator held that any such change needed to be negoti-
ated with the union. The union's argument was that increasing the term
of a club's exclusive right to sign an entering minor league player made
14. See 407 U.S. at 281-84.
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each draft choice more valuable, thereby increasing the cost to and thus
the reluctance of a major league club to part with the draft choice,
thereby in turn making the club less willing to sign a major league free
agent player, and thereby impairing player mobility. It was this example
of the complex interrelationship between major and minor league em-
ployment terms that drove the minor leagues to insist that any change in
the antitrust exclusion be expressly and repeatedly stated to preserve the
exclusion of minor league employment terms from the reach of the anti-
trust laws.
Perhaps the near paranoic concern of the minor leagues about an
individual judge using the new Act as support for applying the antitrust
laws to rules or conduct that Congress clearly did not intend to bring
into antitrust play was fueled by the extraordinary efforts to which Judge
Padova in Philadelphia had gone in Piazza v. Major League Baseball to
find that the historic exclusion only protected the major league "reserve
system" from antitrust attack, and that everything else was subject to
antitrust law to the same extent as in all other sports.15 This decision
might be dismissed as the bizarre and aberrational effort of one Italian-
American judge to give redress to two fellow Italian-American plaintiffs
whom some National League owners had allegedly defamed in connec-
tion with their purported efforts to buy a part interest in the San Fran-
cisco Giants.' 6 Indeed, in the two federal court cases to raise the
baseball exclusion issue since 1993 (keeping in mind that antitrust cases
are exclusively within the jurisdiction of the federal courts), both district
judges expressly rejected the Piazza holding and applied the exclusion to
the broad business of baseball.' 7
15. Piazza, 831 F. Supp. 420.
16. This decision flew in the face of numerous previous lower court decisions that had
held the exclusion applicable to a broad range of activities within the generic rubric of "the
business of baseball." Most notable among these decisions was Finley v. Kuhn, 569 F.2d 527
(7th Cir. 1978) (applying the exclusion to the exercise of the commissioner's authority to act in
"the best interests of baseball"), and Portland Baseball Club v. Kuhn, 491 F.2d 1101 (9th Cir.
1974) (applying the exclusion to the minor league territorial rules). It is noteworthy, however,
that the courts have drawn limits to the exclusion in holding that it does not apply in a number
of contexts involving agreements between baseball entities and third parties that impact on a
commercial market other than one involving the production or direct sale of baseball games.
See Fleer v. Topps Chewing Gum, 658 F.2d 139 (3d Cir. 1981) (involving the market for the
sale of baseball trading cards); Henderson Broadcasting Corp. v. Houston Sports Ass'n
(Houston Astros), 541 F. Supp. 263 (S.D. Tex. 1982) (involving the radio sports broadcasting
market); Twin City Sportservice Inc. v. Charles 0. Finley & Co. (Oakland Athletics), 365 F.
Supp. 235 (N.D. Cal. 1972), rev'd on other grounds, 512 F.2d 1264 (9th Cir. 1975) (involving
the stadium concessions market).
17. See McCoy v. Major League Baseball, 911 F. Supp. 454 (W.D. Wash. 1995) (dismissing
an antirust claim by a class of Seattle Mariners fans who were left with no games to watch
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However, three state courts have since held that Piazza is likely cor-
rect and antitrust laws probably do apply to the decisions of Major
League Baseball involving franchise relocation. Two of these decisions
came in the context of authorizing state attorneys general to conduct
civil investigations against Major League Baseball for possible antitrust
violations,"8 and the third allowed a state antitrust action against MLB.19
With this recent history, the minor leagues were anxious to avoid giving
any more ammunition to other Judge Padovas who might use the new
Act for unintended purposes.
Thus, section 3(b) of the Act provides that
[n]o court shall rely on the enactment of this section as a basis for
changing the application of the antitrust laws to any conduct, acts,
practices, or agreements other than those set forth in subsection
(a). This section does not create, permit or imply a cause of ac-
tion by which to challenge under the antitrust laws, or otherwise
apply the antitrust laws to, any conduct, acts, practices, or agree-
ments that do not directly relate to or affect employment of major
league players to play baseball at the major league level, includ-
ing but not limited to [six categories].
Two things are significant about this language. First, until very late in
the process, the various drafts of the bill led into the laundry list of unaf-
fected rules or conduct by simply saying, in varying forms, that the bill
did not apply to the various categories. At one of the later meetings, the
NAPBL proposed changing the language to say that the Act did not
"create, permit or imply" a valid cause of action against any other con-
duct than defined in subsection (a). This was thought to close the door
more firmly on any future argument that the Act somehow opened the
door for, or gave any impetus to, courts to revisit the historic exclusion
in any context other than major league employment. Thus, this language
was added and is in the Act as finally enacted.
Second, the use of the phrase "changing the application of the anti-
trust laws .. ." was thought by the NAPBL to be very significant. The
during the players strike in the 1994 season); New Orleans Pelican Baseball v. Moore, Civ.
Act. No. 93-253, unpublished memorandum opinion of Judge Martin Feldman (E.D. La., Feb-
ruary 26, 1994) at 18-20 (copy on file with author) (dismissing antitrust claim against minor
league territorial rights rule that prevented New Orleans Saints owner Tom Benson from buy-
ing and bringing the former AA Charlotte Knights to New Orleans as the Pelicans because the
higher classification AAA Denver Zephyrs claimed that territory).
18. See Butterworth v. National League of Professional Baseball Clubs, 644 So.2d 1021
(Fla. 1994); Minnesota Twins Partnership v. State of Minnesota, 1998-1 Trade Cases (CCH)
72,136 (D. Minn. 1998)(at 81,885).
19. See Morsani v. Major League Baseball, 663 So.2d 653 (Fla. App. 1995).
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NAPBL's concerns that have been described earlier led it to propose this
language which strongly implies that Congress recognized that all rules
and conduct not expressly covered in the Act's operative language were
already, and would continue to be, immune from antitrust enforcement.
Early drafts, indeed the initial bill recited earlier in this article, had pro-
vided that the Act "shall not be construed to affect.., the applicability
or nonapplicability" of antitrust law to noncovered rules and conduct.
This totally neutral language was thought by the NAPBL to give no rec-
ognition to the fact that the federal courts (except for Judge Padova in
Piazza) had uniformly recognized an immunity from antitrust for a wide
range of activity. Since the involved senators and Committee staff had
consistently told the NAPBL that they did not want to do anything to
cause antitrust law to be applied to the minor leagues, or to non-labor
market matters in the major leagues, such total neutrality in the lan-
guage was insufficient.
Thus, someone proposed that the language be modified to say that
the Act does not "change" existing law. Since the purpose of the Act is
to "change" the law as it applies to the major league labor market by
making heretofore immune restraints now not immune, a statement that
the Act does not "change" anything else thus creates an implication that
Congress recognized that the historic Federal Baseball/Flood exclusion
does still cover and immunize a wide range of conduct, including specifi-
cally those things listed in the six paragraphs in subsection (b). Accord-
ingly, while the Act would not expressly create an exemption for those
matters, it would create a strong basis for arguing in future cases that
Congress focused on the entire scope of the Federal Baseball exclusion
and decided to lift the antitrust immunity only for the major league labor
market. This would thus strengthen the legal claim that Federal Baseball
still applies to all noncovered rules and conduct because Congress recog-
nized it did and chose not to "change" it, and Justice Blackmun's princi-
ple in Flood that congressional nonintervention is a ground for
preserving the exclusion would still apply. For the NAPBL, this was the
next best thing to an express exemption.
C. Exceptions from Coverage
Section 3(b) not only provides a generic statement to the effect that
only the matters directly affecting major league employment as stated in
Section 3(a) are governed by antitrust law pursuant to the Act, it also list
six specific categories of other types of conduct on which the Act does
not intend to lift the Federal Baseball/Flood immunity. Subsection 1
makes clear that all of the player rules governing the drafting of players
[Vol. 9:413
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and the player-team contractual relationships are still covered by the im-
munity. As noted above, the concern was that because minor league
(NAPBL) players are actually drafted and are under contract to a major
league organization, it could be argued that the language of Section 3(a)
lifting the immunity for matters "directly relating to or affecting employ-
ment of major league baseball players to play baseball at the major
league level" might somehow be interpreted to include minor league
player rules and practices. This subsection makes clear that it does not.
Subsection 2 provides a blanket protection of the minor leagues, in-
cluding their relationship with the major leagues and major league teams
and "any other matter relating to organized professional baseball's mi-
nor leagues."
Subsection 3 provides blanket protection for a wide variety of non-
player rules and practices in both the major and minor leagues, including
all matters dealing with franchise ownership or location, the Office of
the Commissioner, the marketing or sales of baseball games in any man-
ner, and the licensing of intellectual property rights. The last of these
was the most interesting. When the laundry list of matters not affected
by Section 3(a) was first drafted, it did not include the licensing of intel-
lectual property rights. When it was suggested that it do so, there was
reluctance to include this because of the then pending litigation in
Tampa brought by the Yankees and adidas against Major League Base-
ball Properties. The concern was that courts would be likely to interpret
the Act as recognizing that the matters included in the laundry list were
in fact exempt under Federal Baseball/Flood, and Congress did not want
to make such an expression on a matter in dispute in current litigation.
Once that case was settled, however, those involved were willing to in-
clude this in subsection 3. As noted before, this arguably now gives ad-
ditional force to an argument that trademark and logo licensing
arrangements such as those currently underpinning Major League Base-
ball Properties are immune from antitrust enforcement under Federal
Baseball/Flood.
Subsection 4 merely states that the antitrust exemption expressly
provided in the Sports Broadcasting Act of 196120 remains in effect for
baseball. What is most interesting about this subsection, however, is
what it does not say. While most would presumably interpret Section
3(a)'s operative language applying antitrust law to major league player
practices would not implicitly repeal the Sports Broadcasting Act (SBA),
thus making the sale of pooled television rights of the teams in a league
20. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1291 et seq.
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for "sponsored telecasting" exempt, the more interesting question is
whether other types of restrictions on the telecasting or the sale of
broadcasting rights not covered by the SBA were immune from antitrust
under Federal Baseball/Flood. Subsection 4 says nothing about these.
However, it is quite likely that a court will interpret such restrictions as
falling within subsection 3's language that retains the status quo for "the
marketing or sales of the entertainment product of organized profes-
sional baseball" as well as for "the licensing of intellectual property
rights."
Subsection 5 simply makes clear that the Act does not affect the anti-
trust status of rules affecting umpires or other nonplayer employees of
baseball organizations, including managers and coaches.
Subsection 6, while tucked away at the end of the laundry list and
superficially appearing to be quite innocuous, is in fact a very significant
provision. It provides that the Act does not apply antitrust law to "any
conduct, acts, practices, or agreement of persons not in the business of
organized professional major league baseball." Thus, not only does the
operative language of Section 3(a) apply only to rules and conduct di-
rectly affecting major league employment, this subsection limits that to
rules and conduct of "persons in the business of organized professional
major league baseball." This is yet an additional protection for the mi-
nor leagues because it means that even if persons engaged in the busi-
ness of minor league baseball engage in conduct that affects major
league employment, that conduct is not affected by the Act. In other
words, while the operative language of Section 3(a) does not cover cer-
tain conduct, regardless of who engages in it, subsection 6 goes further
and insulates certain defendants (i.e., everyone except the major
leagues) from having any of their conduct subject to antitrust scrutiny
There is, however, arguably some ambiguity about how the Act will
apply to conduct affecting major league employment involving persons
in both the minor and major leagues. A plaintiff could argue that if any
person involved in major league baseball is involved, the conduct would
fall within the scope of the Act and the antitrust immunity would not
protect anyone involved in it. That, however, is contrary to the under-
standing and expectations of those involved in drafting this language.
Subsection 6 was intended to mean, and presumably will be interpreted,
so that only the major league team could be sued because the conduct of
the minor league team is not covered. That this is so can be gleaned
from the use of the term "directly" and the additional gloss provided by
subsection (d)(2).
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D. The Standing Limitation
One of the most intriguing, and potentially mischievious, provisions
of the Act is Section 3(c) which proclaims that "[o]nly a major league
baseball player has standing to sue under this section." This language
was added well into the process as yet another concession to the minor
leagues, which were still concerned about a judge who might interpret
the Act much more broadly than intended by Congress or by the parties
involved in drafting the bill's language. No matter how aggressively a
judge might be tempted to interpret the operative language of the Act to
apply antitrust law to the minor leagues (or major league non-player
matters), the risk of exposure would be greatly reduced for the NAPBL
and MLB if only major league players could bring the lawsuits. This is,
of course, what Section 3(c) intends to do-limit previously barred anti-
trust suits against either minor or major league baseball leagues or teams
to those brought by major league players."'
The potential difficulty with this provision is that when Section 3(c)
says that "only a major league player has standing to sue under this sec-
tion" (i.e., the new 15 U.S.C. § 27 which codifies the Curt Flood Act), it
creates confusion because the Act does not create a cause of action to
sue. Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act,22 Sections 2, 3, and 7 of the
Clayton Act,23 and Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act24
establish the major substantive provisions of the antitrust laws, and Sec-
tion 4 of the Sherman Act,25 Sections 4, 4a and 16 of the Clayton Act,
26
and Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act 27 create standing for
the Justice Department, the FTC, and qualifying private plaintiffs to
bring actions for damages or injunctive relief against alleged antitrust
violators. The Curt Flood Act neither creates substantive antitrust law
nor grants standing to anyone to sue under any substantive antitrust pro-
visions. The Act merely expands the definitional scope of the "interstate
commerce" element in each of the various substantive antitrust sections
to include the business of baseball as it affects the major league labor
21. There was then extensive quibbling over how to define a "major league player," which
was finally resolved in the second sentence of subsection 3(c) with its four categories of per-
sons who would fall within the definition. while these categories are filled with nuances aris-
ing out of hypothetical cases put forth by those involved, none appear to be of any great
analytical significance.
22. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1 & 2.
23. 15 U.S.C. §§ 13, 14 & 18.
24. 15 U.S.C. § 45.
25. 15 U.S.C. § 4.
26. 15 U.S.C. §§ 15, 15a & 26.
27. 15 U.S.C. § 45.
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market-i.e., it lifts the Federal Baseball/Flood immunity-but it does
not create any substantive rights. Thus, the literal language of Section
3(c) of the Curt Flood Act giving only major league players standing to
sue "under this section" does not make sense because nobody has stand-
ing to sue under "this section."
There are two possible ways to interpret this somewhat baffling lan-
guage. The first is that it only allows major league players (as defined in
Section 3(c)'s second sentence) to bring antitrust suits against a major or
minor league team or organization. The difficulty with this interpreta-
tion, however, is that the Act would thus deny standing to some plaintiffs
who would have had standing to sue a baseball organization even with-
out passage of the Act-i.e., a plaintiff whose cause of action would not
have been defeated by the Federal Baseball/Flood immunity. A baseball
defendant would have a hard time convincing any court that the intent of
any of those involved in drafting or voting for the Act was to deny anti-
trust standing to parties who would have had a valid cause of action and
standing to bring it without any regard for or reference to the Act.
The second and clearly more reasonable way to interpret Section 3(c)
is that it denies antitrust standing to any plaintiff other than major league
players who must rely in any way on the Act as a basis for defeating a
Federal Baseball/Flood defense. This is quite a peculiar addition to civil
procedure doctrine in that it in effect deprives standing to plaintiffs not
based on any aspect of their case as it is set forth in their complaint at
the time suit is filed, but rather based on an argument they may make
during the case. The scenario would be that a non-major league player
fies an antitrust suit against a baseball organization. The defendant
would then either move to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) or include in its
answer an affirmative defense based on Federal Baseball/Flood. At this
point, if the plaintiff countered the motion to dismiss by relying on the
provisions of the Curt Flood Act, it would trigger Section 3(c).
But what would the effect of that be? Would it then mean that, as
Section 3(c) says, plaintiff would not have "standing to sue" to bring the
antitrust claim (which is what lacking "standing to sue" typically means)
and the cause of action would be dismissed, or would it merely mean
that plaintiff would not be permitted to argue the Curt Flood Act as a
basis for defeating a Federal Baseball/Flood defense (which would be a
novel and perverse use of the concept of "standing"). If the former, the
mere raising of the Curt Flood Act as an argument would cause the en-
tire cause of action to be dismissed (i.e., the plaintiff lacked "standing to
sue"), even if there was also a legitimate argument that the historic base-
ball immunity did not apply. If the latter, the plaintiff would merely be
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deprived of the right to raise a particular argument, but would not be
deprived of the right to pursue the claim if an independent way around
the Federal Baseball/Flood defense were accepted by the court.
While the second approach might arguably be more likely in keeping
with the intent many of those involved in the process would have had if
they had thought about it, that is not what the statutory language says
and it is not consistent with depriving the plaintiff of "standing to sue."
This second approach really would only deprive the plaintiff of the legal
"right to argue" something. To adopt the second approach and merely
deprive a nonmajor league player plaintiff of the "right to argue" the
Curt Flood Act would require courts to ignore the plain meaning of the
statute, adopt an interpretation wholly at odds with the concept of stand-
ing to sue, and fly in the face of basic principles of statutory construction.
As Justice Frankfurter expounded in a famous speech to the New York
Bar in 1947:
[T]he purpose which a court must effectuate is not that which
Congress should have enacted, or would have. It is that which it
did enact, however inaptly, because it may fairly be said to be
embedded in the statute, even if a specific manifestation was not
thought of .... 28
Spurious use of legislative history must not swallow the legis-
lation so as to give point to the quip that only when legislative
history is doubtful do you go to the statute. While courts are no
longer confined to the language, they are still confined by it. Vio-
lence must not be done to the words chosen by the legislature. 9
Recognizing the limitations on the age-old "Plain Meaning" canon of
statutory interpretation,"° it would nonetheless be near impossible for a
court to interpret section (b)(3)'s provision that only "a major league
player has standing to sue under this section" as merely barring a non-
major league player plaintiff from being able to argue that the Act lifts
the Federal Baseball immunity without doing violence to the clear and
plain meaning of the expression "standing to sue." Thus, it would ap-
pear that this section dictates that if any nonmajor league player plaintiff
raises the Curt Flood Act in response to a Federal Baseball/Flood-based
28. Felix Frankfurter, Some Reflections On The Reading Of Statutes 21 (1947), 47 CoLurl.
L. REv. 527, 539 (1947).
29. Id. at 543.
30. See my earlier discussion of this doctrine and its limitations in a different context,
Gary Roberts, Reconciling Federal Labor and Antitrust Policy: The Special Case of Sports
League Labor Market Restraints, 75 GEo. L. J. 19, 35-40 (1986).
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motion by a baseball defendant to dismiss an antitrust claim, that anti-
trust claim would have to be immediately dismissed, not only because of
Federal Baseball/Flood, but because the plaintiff would lack "standing to
sue."
Interestingly, this limitation on standing also has significant and
novel implications for the Antitrust Division of the Justice Department.
The Justice Department has always had standing to bring suit against any
violation of the antitrust laws.3' Section 3(c), by denying standing
(whatever that means) to everyone except major league players, leaves
the Antitrust Division without standing to bring some kinds of actions
against baseball organizations. Even under the narrowest interpretation
of Section 3(c), only major league players have the right to raise the Curt
Flood Act as a counter to a baseball defendant's assertion of the Federal
BaseballFlood immunity as a defense. Thus, Section 3(c) will deprive
the Justice Department (and presumably, although not as certainly, the
FTC32) from being able to sue a baseball organization for something that
was immune from attack prior to the Curt Flood Act and which the Act
now exposes to private antitrust enforcement by major league players.
Major league players have standing to bring such suits, but the Justice
Department and (presumably) the FTC do not. That is indeed an un-
precedented and unique twist in American antitrust law.
E. The "Interpretive" Provisions
Section 3(d) of the Act contains five subsections, each of which is
designed to clarify language in the earlier sections or to give guidance for
the interpretation of those sections. As with so many provisions earlier
in the Act, most of what is contained in these provisions is there to pro-
tect the NAPBL from having an overreaching judge use the Act to bring
minor leagues rules or conduct within the scope of antitrust law.
a. Subsection 1. Subsection 1 merely defines "person" as being virtu-
ally any type of human or legal entity, including every baseball team or
league no matter how organized. It also specifically states that the
NAPBL and its leagues and teams are not "in the business of organized
31. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 4, 15a.
32. Because the FTC has authority under section 5 of the FTC Act to challenge "unfair
methods of competition," which the Supreme Court has held includes conduct beyond that
which is actionable as violative of antitrust law, see FTC v. Sperry & Hutchinson, 405 U.S. 233
(1972), it is arguable that the FTC has always had jurisdiction and authority to challenge the
rules and conduct of baseball that were immune from antitrust attack under Federal Baseball!
Flood. If so, it would seem likely that section 3(c) of the Act would not strip the FTC of that
jurisdiction and authority.
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professional major league baseball," so that among other things, the pro-
tection afforded by Section 3(b)(6) (excluding the conduct of those not
in the major league baseball business from the scope of the operative
language) would not be lost by an expansive interpretation of that term.
b. Subsection 2. Subsection 2 is designed to make clear that the oper-
ative language of Section 3(a) can not be used as a bootstrap to drag into
its coverage other conduct which a court might attach to it. Thus, for
example, if a baseball rule affects both major and minor league employ-
ment, that rule can only be challenged under antitrust law as a result of
the Act to the extent it affects major league employment; and the extent
to which it affects minor league employment would continue to be im-
mune from attack under Federal Baseball/Flood.
c. Subsection 3. Subsection 3 was suggested by the MLBPA out of a
concern, not shared by others, that conduct "directly" related to major
league employment-and thus now subject to antitrust scrutiny under
Section 3(a)-not be limited by notions borrowed from federal labor law
(the National Labor Relations Act, specifically 29 U.S.C. §§ 151 et seq.),
under which management may take unilateral action without committing
an unfair labor practice for failing to bargain in good faith in some areas
that are not "directly" related to employment conditions and thus not
mandatory subjects of bargaining.u It is not at all clear that the
Supreme Court's definition of "directly" in this aspect of labor law is
particularly narrow or that there is any more sensible definition if the
meaning of the term as used in the Curt Flood Act were actually dis-
puted. Also notably, this section does not define "directly"; it merely
says that it should not be defined based on labor law decisions. And
since there was no other discussion or legislative history surrounding the
meaning of this term, this bare provision leaves open the possibility that
a court intepreting "directly" as used in the Curt Flood Act could adopt
a definition either narrower, the same, or broader than it is used in the
labor law decisions. Thus, including this subsection was not
controversial.
d. Subsection 4. Subsection 4, while stating a seemingly self-evident
proposition, nonetheless clarifies that the Act cannot be used as a basis
for arguing that the labor exemption from antitrust does not apply to
baseball any more. This is especially important in the light of the
Supreme Court's 1996 decision in Brown v. Pro Football, Inc,3 4 which
held that as long as there is a collective bargaining relationship between
33. See, e.g., First National Maintenance Corp. v. NLRB, 452 U.S. 666 (1981).
34. 116 S.Ct. 2116 (1996).
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a league and a union representing its players, neither the union nor any
of its members may bring an antitrust claim against the league or its
member teams involving matters which are mandatory subjects of collec-
tive bargaining under the National Labor Relations Act. Thus, subsec-
tion 4 of the Act means that as long as the MLBPA continues to
represent the major league players in collective bargaining as their certi-
fied representative under the NLRA, the union and players may not
challenge player restraints as antitrust violations.35 And given that the
only previously barred antitrust suits that the Act now permits are those
brought by major league players (see section 3(c)) challenging rules or
conduct by persons in the business of major league baseball (see section
3(b)(6)) that directly affect the market for major league employment
(see section 3(a)&(b)), the only situations in which the Act permits anti-
trust claims against baseball are exactly those situations that are exempt
under the labor exemption and the Brown decision.
For this reason, as long as the MLBPA remains an NLRB certified
union that is the exclusive representative of the players for collective
bargaining purposes, the Act accomplishes virtually nothing. Everything
not exempt under the labor exemption and Brown is not affected by the
Curt Flood Act and thus likely still immune from antitrust attack under
Federal Baseball/Flood. Everything that loses its immunity under the
Act is still exempt under the labor exemption and Brown. The only way
for the players to get out from under this constraint, and to take advan-
tage of antitrust litigation allowed now after the Act, is to decertify the
union as their exclusive bargaining representative. The NFL players did
this when the NFLPA unilaterally renounced its rights under the NLRA
35. Interestingly, while the Brown decision was briefed, argued, and decided on the non-
statutory prong of the labor exemption, a strong case could be made that in fact it is the
statutory prong of the exemption that actually prevents unions from suing multi-employer
bargaining units during the process of negotiating a new bargaining agreement. See Gary
Roberts, Brown v. Pro Football, Inc.: The Supreme Court Gets It Right For The Wrong Rea-
sons, 17 ANTRUST BULL. 595, 616-28 (Fall 1997). Section 3(d)(4) says that the Act does not
affect the application only of the nonstatutory exemption. There is nothing in the record,
there was nothing expressed during the discussions relating to the drafting of the Act, and
there is no logical reason to support any suggestion that the Act intended to affect the applica-
tion of the statutory labor exemption to professional baseball. It would be absurd on its face
to think that the Act, in language designed solely to protect baseball organizations emphati-
cally from being put at antitrust risk for all but the most narrow types of situations outlined in
the operative language of section 3(a), in effect repealed the statutory labor exemption for
baseball when that exemption is available for every other employer in the economy. Thus, the
semantic ambiguity in subsection 3(d)(4) that arises from its reference only to the nonstatu-
tory exemption cannot rationally be used to claim that the purpose of this subsection was to
do anything other than to leave the entire labor exemption as it already applies to baseball
unaffected by the Act.
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in 1989 after the Eighth Circuit ruled in Powell v. NFL that the labor
exemption barred its suit against the NFL during collective bargaining. 6
The players then filed the same antitrust claim in McNeil v. NFL, which
the district judge ruled was not barred by the labor exemption because
the union had properly ended the collective bargaining relationship.3 7
But the NFL appealed this ruling, arguing that the NFLPA had not re-
ally decertified since it remained as a representative of the players in the
same offices, with the same officers and employees, the same governing
board, and the same objectives-thus the NFL argued that the NFLPA
was now just a union in disguise that was refusing to fulfill its legal obli-
gation to bargain in good faith. The McNeil case was settled in 1994
before the Eighth Circuit could resolve this issue, and thus the question
of what a players union must do to decertify itself sufficiently to release
itself from the labor exemption bar remains unanswered.
Given all of this, the only way for the MLBPA to gain the benefit of
being able to bring an antitrust suit now not barred by Federal Baseball!
Flood is to end its status as an NLRB certified union, even though it is
not entirely clear what the minimum requirement for such decertifica-
tion is. This is a costly process that strips the union during the lengthy
pendency of the antitrust case of its ability, among other things, to certify
and control player agents and to be involved in the control of collectively
bargained player pension and disability plans. Since the labor exemption
that protects union activity would be surrendered, decertification might
also expose the Association to antitrust risks of its own in various mat-
ters, including the group licensing of players rights to their likenesses. It
also diminishes the importance of the Association leadership in the pro-
cess of negotiating a new arrangement with the teams since that would
have to be undertaken by antitrust counsel in the context of settling the
antitrust suit. For these, and possibly other reasons, the NBPA did not
undertake to decertify and file an antitrust suit during the lengthy lock-
out that resulted in the loss of the first half of the 1998-99 NBA season
and an eventual settlement that most observers felt was not favorable to
the players. Thus, the only way for the MLBPA to benefit directly from
the Curt Flood Act would be for it to undertake a costly and risky decer-
tification that it would probably employ only as a last resort.
Of course, at some extreme point, the MLBPA would likely be will-
ing to undertake to decertify in order to bring an antitrust suit during
collective bargaining. Just the threat of being able to do so will give it
36. 888 F.2d 559 (8th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1040 (1991).
37. 764 F. Supp. 1351 (D. Minn. 1991).
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some incremental bargaining leverage. But on balance, the marginal
bargaining benefit that the Act gives the players seems quite minimal-
seemingly not worth the substantial effort the Association expended to
get the Act passed. And it undoubtedly explains in large part the own-
ers' willingness to agree in the CBA to cooperate with the union in get-
ting the Act passed.
e. Subsection 5. Finally, subsection 5 provides even more protection
for the minor leagues (as well as the major leagues on nonplayer mat-
ters) by making sure that judges interpreting those matters described in
section 3(b) as not affected by the operative language of section 3(a) do
not construe those categories of unaffected conduct narrowly. This lan-
guage was added because of the general rule of construction that anti-
trust exemptions are to be construed narrowly and the NAPBL's fear
that a judge looking to use the Act as a way to get around Federal Base-
ball/Flood would label section 3(b) as an exemption and then construe it
very narrowly. (Notably, the NAPBL believes and hopes that courts will
interpret section 3(b) as recognizing the already immune status of the six
categories, which is very close to an express exemption that would thus
normally be construed narrowly.) Subsection 5 eliminates that as a pos-
sible a line of reasoning.
III. THE CONCEPTUAL JUSTIFICATION FOR CONTINUED IMMUNITY
FOR NONCOVERED MATTERS
The fundamental reason that the drafters of the Curt Flood Act were
so willing to give great protection to the minor leagues was the pure
political clout that comes from having an organization with over 200 sig-
nificant business organization members from almost as many congres-
sional districts and several states. But even purely politically motivated
congressmen and senators are much more comfortable having some pub-
lic interest rational for their action.
With respect to major league practices other than those affecting the
player market, the rational for not including them in the matters for
which the exclusion is lifted is simply that the agreement between the
owners and MLBPA in their CBA only dealt with player matters. Also,
especially with respect to franchise relocation issues, there was a strong
sense among the legislators, planted over the years by MLB, that with-
out the exemption, teams would be more free to relocate and thus put
their teams up to the highest bidding city in the same way NFL teams
had done so often over the past two decades since the infamous Raiders
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case.38 Thus, because the implications of lifting the exclusion for other
than labor market matters were not fully understood or explored, there
was little enthusiasm for lifting the immunity for major league matters
other than those affecting major league players.
The rational for continuing to immunize the minor leagues from anti-
trust enforcement was more elaborately developed. In a nutshell, if the
minor leagues were subject to antitrust scrutiny with respect to any or all
of its operations, the effect would inevitably be to increase the costs of
operating minor league teams and/or to reduce the subsidy that minor
league teams get from their major league parent teams. Furthermore, if
rules giving minor league teams exclusive playing territories were subject
to antitrust review, there is a good chance that teams in the smaller
towns and cities across the nation, especially in the face of higher costs
and lower subsidies from the major leagues, would feel free to abandon
their roots and relocate into bigger cities where they could sell more
tickets. Thus, applying antitrust law to the minor leagues would un-
doubtedly create a profit squeeze on many teams and create conditions
for a fundamental restructuring of the minor leagues.
Normally, this type of effect would not be a matter of public concern.
Indeed, the principle underlying antitrust law is that the forces of the
marketplace should be allowed to work, and inevitably those forces of
supply and demand will require adjustments in the marketplace that,
while temporarily causing frictional discomfort and dislocation for some,
will in the long run inure to the benefit of consumers and the public. But
in the case of the minor leagues, there is a crucial "externality" that
makes this free market model inappropriate and justifies an "exemp-
tion" from antitrust enforcement.
Sports are materially distinguishable from most products and serv-
ices in that they are consumed much more widely than only by those
who pay directly for them. While certainly people who buy tickets or
luxury suites for games or pay rights fees in order to put games on radio
or television are consuming the product in a way that the microeconomic
model of the free market contemplates, the product of a sports league
and its teams is consumed to a great extent by those in the public who do
not buy tickets or broadcast rights. Sports creates enjoyment (i.e., eco-
nomic utility) for all those who read the daily newspaper's sports section
or watch the sports news on television, who discuss or argue over the
performance of the local team and its players in their offices, homes,
38. Los Angeles Mem. Coliseum Comm'n v. NFL, 726 F.2d 1381 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
469 U.S. 990 (1984).
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schools, or barber shops, who become involved in office betting pools,
and who listen to and participate in talk radio shows. In this sense,
sports is very much a "public good" that is consumed to a very large
extent by "free riders" who enjoy the utility created by this public good
without having to pay directly for it.
Antitrust law is founded on the view that enhancing competition in a
market will move the allocation of society's scarce resources closer to
optimizing consumer utility. But in a suboptimal world in which many
markets suffer from substantial externalities such as networking effects
and free riding, making one market function closer to the point where
marginal cost intersects average revenue/demand does not necessarily
achieve an increase in total consumer welfare, and may well actually di-
minish consumer welfare. This is especially true in the case of the mar-
kets in which professional baseball, and particularly minor league
baseball, function.
Just as one example. Assume there are two minor league baseball
teams in a country with two cities, one with 5 million inhabitants and the
other with 1 million inhabitants. These teams earn their revenue solely
from the sale of tickets. In a free market, those two teams will thus
select the city in which they can sell the most tickets, which, assuming
demographic similarity between the two cities, means that both of these
teams will end up in the larger city and neither team will play in the
smaller city. While this will likely lead to greater total attendance at
minor league baseball games, and thus greater consumer welfare for
those who pay for the right to consume the product, it will nonetheless
diminish total consumer welfare because the inhabitants of the smaller
city will be left without a team about which they can identify and read in
the local newspapers, discuss in their homes and offices, and follow
throughout the season. Total consumer utility will be maximized if one
team is in the larger city and the other in the smaller city, but in a legally
imposed free market in which only consumer expenditures for game
tickets count, both teams will end up in the same city to the detriment of
total consumer welfare.39
39. This same phenomenon also explains in part the willingness of communities and their
politicians to subsidize local teams through the building of facilities designed to attract and
keep teams in the community. Since the citizens of the community get a great deal of enjoy-
ment out of the presence of a home team, and thus "free ride" on the utility created by the
team and its league, rather than lose the team to another community they are willing to pay
indirectly to the team something up to the value of the utility the team creates for the commu-
nity but for which the team is not directly compensated.
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This same type of analysis can be used in many of the markets in
which minor league teams function. What this ultimately means is that
the underlying assumption of antitrust law, to the extent it is valid in
other markets where consumption is largely by those consumers who pay
directly for the product, does not predictably apply in most cases to pro-
fessional sports and particularly minor league baseball leagues and
teams. Thus, minor league baseball is a fitting candidate for an exemp-
tion from the normal enforcement of antitrust law. It is this rationale
that enabled Congress to maintain the historic Federal Baseball/Flood
antitrust exclusion for the minor leagues in the Curt Flood Act without
appearing to be acting for purely political reasons.
CONCLUSION
While the impetus for the Curt Flood Act came from the MLBPA
and some legislators who wanted to restrict the antitrust immunity of
Major League Baseball derived from the Federal Baseball/Flood line of
cases, the ensuing protections for baseball, and especially the minor
leagues, that were put into the Act, coupled with the antitrust protection
of Brown v. Pro-Football, Inc. for all sports leagues from suits brought
by unionized players, make the likely effect of the Act actually to expand
the scope and strength of the antitrust immunity in most respects and
leave it largely unaffected in the major league player-labor market.
Thus, legislation that started out to apply antitrust more broadly to base-
ball has probably caused exactly the opposite effect.
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